JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This article explores the use of logical formalization to clarify an area of research characterized by conflicting claims and divergent empirical findings. The substantive focus concerns the relation between organization age and the hazard of mortality. The literature contains claims that the hazard (a) falls with age (a "liability of newness"), (b) rises initially and then falls with age (a "liability of adolescence"), (c) rises with age ("liabilities of senescence and obsolescence"). The formalizations reported cast the relevant theoretical arguments as propositions involving five concepts: endowment, imprinting, inertia, capability, and position. It shows that each of the theoretical stories can be derived as implications of particular assumptions within two broad formalizations. This analysis clarifies the mechanisms at work in each theoretical account and provides guidance for empirical research designed to discriminate among the competing theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article uses the tools of rational reconstruction and logical formalization to reexamine issues of aging and organizational mortality. This reexamination is prompted by increasing divergence in empirical findings about what was regarded as an established fact: the hazard of organizational mortality is higher for young organizations than for old ones (see below). Previous efforts to explain this pattern and the efforts to explain recent divergent findings have yielded a set of partly congruent and partly conflicting theoretical stories. The analysis presented here tries to make sense out of the resulting welter of claims. It reconstructs the arguments in terms of a set of common theoretical constructs, translates them into the language of first-order logic (FOL), and derives their implications.
One goal of this effort is methodological and aims to show that the strategy of logical formalization can play a valuable role in theory building in a context of a set of conflicting theories. The recent successful uses of this methodology in sociology have focused on evaluating the consistency, soundness, and other properties of a particular theory as stated in single text. So, for instance, Péli et al. (1994) , , Péli and Masuch (1997) have formalized various theory fragments in organizational ecology, and Pó los and Kamps (1997) formalized a portion of Thompson's (1967) theory. These efforts have clarified the logic of the theories, sharpened their assumptions, and suggested previously unrecognized implications and better understandings of the ideas. This article applies the methodology to an area of inquiry that now lacks canonical theory. Instead of examining the implications of a single argument, it seeks to clarify how the various alternative stories "work," what must be assumed to yield the opposing claims. Formalization has two potential advantages in this kind of setting. First, by identifying the assumptions that really do the work in the different stories, such formalization can provide guidance to empirical research, directing attention to relationships that need special scrutiny. Second, it can serve as the basis for building new theories that have the alternative stories as clearly defined special cases.
A second goal is substantive. This involves developing more fully a distinction that lies at the heart of much sociological analysis of organizations but has not received much theoretical attention: how capabilitybased advantages and positional advantages combine to shape organizational life chances. In particular, this formalization builds on a distinction between fragile and robust positions and specifies the difference in terms of the degree to which advantage accruing to position generalizes across states of the environment. This kind of distinction yields implications about organizational mortality processes that resonate with the results of recent empirical research.
A. Substantive Background
Two images coexist uneasily in standard sociological analyses of organizational mortality. One regards the structural features of organizations as mappings from the environment encountered at founding (Stinchcombe 1965) , and it depicts organizations as locked into their initial forms. Structural inertia dominates this image: organizations have very limited capacities to reshape their core structures (their forms) as quickly as the environment changes (Hannan and Freeman 1977) . Efforts at change in core features diminish life chances, at least in the short run (Hannan and Freeman 1984) . Therefore, when environments are variable and uncertain, extensive change in the distribution of organizational forms occurs by selection processes operating on organizational populations.
The second view concentrates on the life-history dynamics of organizations. It portrays young organizations as particularly vulnerable to environmental selection-they face a liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) . Aging conveys advantages, such as improved capabilities and more secure structural positions, that tend to insulate older organizations from damage due to environmental turbulence. Hence the life chances of organizations improve with aging.
The two images do not necessarily conflict. For instance, large shifts in the environment might increase mortality rates for all organizations in a population and also expose the youngest organizations to the most intense force of mortality. This said, it must be admitted that the two theoretical images do not fit comfortably. Structural inertia in the face of environmental change ought to erode fitness. If new organizations can incorporate current understandings, best practices, and state-of-the-art technology in their core structures and if old organizations have the core structures that reflect a bygone era, why do old organizations have better life chances?
The two images became paired within sociological theories of organization because theorists regarded the liability of newness as an empirical fact that must be accommodated. Carroll (1983) , Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) , and much subsequent research showed that the liability of newness held for an impressive range of populations of firms and other kinds of organizations.
2 Thus early organizational ecology research assumed negative age dependence as a baseline model for specifying ecological hypotheses. Hannan and Freeman (1984) derived the liability of newness from an evolutionary theory of structural inertia and organizational change. 3 Subsequent research showed that the relationship between age and mortality rates sometimes takes a more complicated form. Mortality rates sometimes begin low, then rise after a brief interval before settling into a pattern of long-term decline with age. This pattern has been dubbed "a liability of adolescence" (Brü derl and Schü ssler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991; Brü derl, Preisendö rfer, and Ziegler 1996) .
As long as the belief in the empirical validity of the claim that mortality rates decline with aging (perhaps beyond some initial interval) remained unshaken, there was little impetus to scrutinize the seeming incongruence between the stories based on inertia and those based on age-related improvements in capabilities and positions. However, the empirical picture has begun to change. It has become recognized that the research establishing the generality of negative age dependence (beyond an initial period) failed to control for the effects of variations in size over organizational lifetimes. This neglect matters because size variations might account for the observed low mortality rates of old organizations: organizations tend to grow as they age, and mortality rates decline with size. For instance, Barron, West, and Hannan (1994) reported results that turned the estimated effect of age on mortality rates from (significant) negative to (significant) positive in one organizational population. And, they proposed that the important liabilities involve processes of senescence and obsolescence.
Evidence on the effects of controlling for size in studies of age dependence has been mounting rapidly. Hannan et al. (1998) identified 18 studies that report the results of analyses that relate organizational mortality rates to age and size and that also update size repeatedly over the life spans of all (or nearly all) organizations in a population. Five studies find monotonic negative effects of age, even after controlling for age-varying organizational size. Four studies find a variation on the pattern of nonmonotonic age dependence: an inverted-U shape pattern of age dependence after controlling for age-varying size. The remaining nine studies find monotonic positive age dependence once age variations in organizational size have been taken into account. What do these 18 studies imply? If one combines studies reporting monotonic negative effects of age on mortality rates and those showing inverted-U shaped effects of age on mortality rates (because both imply that the mortality rates of old organizations fall below those of younger ones), the result is a draw: nine studies find positive age dependence and nine studies find (long-run) negative age dependence. 4 All 18 studies share the assumption that age and size have proportional effects on mortality rates. Hannan et al. (1998) argue that such an assumption is not warranted; they find that effects of size and age on mortality rates in populations of automobile manufacturers in four countries are indeed nonproportional. They suggest that the divergence among the earlier studies might be due to the nonproportionality in the effect combined with heterogeneity in the size distributions among the populations studied. These findings hint that the existing theoretical formulations need revision.
This divergence in empirical findings demands rethinking of the issue of age dependence in organizational mortality. The available theoretical accounts (entailing liabilities of newness, adolescence, senescence, and obsolescence) cannot all be true generally, because they disagree about the form of age dependence in processes of organizational mortality. Can these theories be reconciled and unified? Can conditions be specified that tell when one theory applies and others do not? At the present state of development of the theories, we lack clear answers to these questions. The informal nature of the argumentation makes it hard to discern the assumptions invoked in each account. Moreover, it is not even clear that each account is internally consistent, that the conclusions follow from the premises. Continued theoretical progress likely requires that the informal arguments be made more precise and formal and that systematic tools be used to evaluate the theoretical claims.
This article, which builds upon an empirical effort by Hannan et al. (1998) , tries to sort out the relevant theories and use the strategy of logical formalization to clarify some basic differences among them. It seeks to make explicit the tacit assumptions that inform the various theories about age dependence so that we might better understand the interplay between arguments about age dependence and general sociological theories of organizations. Following Péli et al. (1994) , , and Pó los and Kamps (1997), the formalizations of the competing theories use the tools of firstorder logic (FOL). The first step in the analysis, sometimes called rational reconstruction, tries to represent the essence of each argument in stark and simple terms, as a set of assumptions and proposed theorems. The second step checks whether the proposed theorems follow logically from the assumptions.
The stage of rational reconstruction of the informal theories in formal language would ideally work from a single set of axioms thought to be true in all circumstances. However, the relevant sociological arguments do not reflect agreement about such first principles. This means that one cannot begin with the same premises in constructing each theoretical argument without radically changing the spirit of at least one of the contending arguments. Instead of imposing unification at the outset, this analysis seeks to formalize each account on its own terms. In doing so, I try to find constructive interpretations. That is, when several alternative ren-derings of the verbal argument are available, I adopt the ones that can allow the conclusions to follow from the premises . The goal of the rational reconstruction is formalizing each theory as a logically consistent system stated in terms that are sufficiently similar to guide subsequent efforts at unification.
II. DECOMPOSING THE ARGUMENTS
The first step in formalizing the theories is to survey the theoretical terrain. The relevant theoretical arguments can be built from propositions concerning five concepts: endowment, imprinting, inertia, capability, and position (Hannan et al. 1998) .
A. Endowments
Organizations differ in the quantities and qualities of their initial resources. Some get endowed with extensive financial and social capital, because their founders have great wealth, status, or political influence or because the social conditions of founding are favorable (resources might be abundant and few corporate actors might be competing for them). Others find themselves severely disadvantaged at founding, with these conditions reversed. Endowments bear on the issues under consideration in two ways. First, developing capabilities is costly, and extensive endowments permit greater investment in capability. Carroll and Hannan (1989) argue that organizations founded in periods of intense competition for resources face a liability of scarcity. They cannot invest in developing capabilities, and the failure to make such investments at the outset has irreversible negative consequences for life chances. Second, endowments can affect mortality rates directly. A well-endowed organization can maintain its structures and members even if it cannot continually mobilize resources from the environment. Endowments matter most in the first months and years of operation. Endowments depreciate unless replenished by continuing positive flows of resources from the environment. Until an endowment has been depleted, the organization's risk of mortality is low. Once the endowment gets exhausted, the risk of mortality jumps. The implications for age dependence in mortality rates are clear. At a given level of endowment, the mortality rate remains low during the period of depletion, and it jumps afterward. That is, mortality rates increase with age. The usual formulation of this idea (Brü derl et al. 1996) regards the level of endowment as an unobservable random variable, which makes the length of the period of exhaustion also an unobservable random variable. If the distribution of endowments is (roughly) continuous, one will observe that the hazard of mortality rises smoothly from zero to a peak (the point of exhaustion for the best-endowed organizations).
B. Imprinting and Structural Inertia
Imprinting refers to a process in which events occurring at certain key developmental stages have persisting-possibly lifelong-consequences. The idea that firms and other kinds of organizations tend to be imprinted by their founding conditions comes from Stinchcombe's (1965) insight that social and economic structures have their maximal impact on new organizations. In attempting to accumulate financial and human capital, entrepreneurs expose their designs to intense scrutiny. Proposals get tested against taken-for-granted assumptions about structural forms and employment relations. Because conventional wisdoms and taken-for-granted assumptions change over historical time (as new forms flourish and others wane), the tests imposed on proto-organization also change. Consequently, the kinds of organizations that emerge reflect the social structure of the founding period. Imprinting requires an initial mapping of an environmental condition onto the nascent corporate actor. The imprinted characteristics must be inert (or at least possess a fair degree of hysteresis). Otherwise, subsequent modifications of the structure will erode the association of founding conditions and those features.
What does imprinting imply about age dependence in mortality rates? If imprinting occurs, then founders build organizations that fit historically specific environments. If core features of organizations get set by early decisions and actions and resist change afterward, then environmental change will erode the fit between organizations and environments. Barron et al. (1994) assume that the distance of an organization's current environment from its founding-period environment varies directly with its age. Then, the quality of the match declines monotonically with age, and age dependence is positive. In other words, the joint action of imprinting, inertia, and environmental change create a liability of obsolescence.
C. Capability
An organizational capability is an ability to execute routines and solve problems. An organization's capabilities consist of its stock of solutions to the problem of producing collective action in a specified environment. In other words, capabilities are context specific. Capabilities are often based on routines that codify an organization's dispersed learning (March 1988; Nelson and Winter 1982) . An important dimension of capability involves the capacity to reduce friction among the many activities and routines that typically must be undertaken to produce the organization's collective product. The more refined and harmonized an organization's routines, the greater the organization's capability in the specified environment. Therefore, in a stable environment, improvements in capability increase the expected quality of performance and thereby decrease the risk of mortality.
A key part of Stinchcombe's argument for the liability of newness concerns the effect of aging on capabilities. In particular, he argues that new organizations suffer from low average quality of performance because they lack experience. As youthful organizations age, they acquire experience and can potentially learn. The stylized image of the organizational learning curve captures this kind of process. As organizations learn from experience, they refine their productive routines and the metaroutines that coordinate them.
Stinchcombe also argues that new organizations face jeopardy because they must rely on the cooperation of strangers. To the extent that trust enhances collective action, lack of familiarity among coworkers is problematic. As time passes, trust tends to develop within work groups. As a result, the organization's capabilities improve, because an important source of friction has been reduced. Subsequent theory has followed Stinchcombe's lead in emphasizing that experience improves capabilities. For instance, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that norms of rationality demand that organizations achieve low variance in the quality of their outputs and make systematic, rational accounts of their activities. Not all organizations can achieve reliability and accountability; those that do have survival advantages. New organizations lack these capabilities, which must be acquired through learning by doing and the accumulation of organization-specific human capital. Therefore, the development and refinement of these capabilities depends upon age.
Some recent lines of argument about capabilities run opposite this mainstream view. Barron et al. (1994) draw on an analogy to senescence processes observable in animal and human life histories. They suggest that organizations accumulate durable features, such as precedents, political coalitions, and taken-for-granted understandings, that constrain modifications in patterns of collective action. Such encrustation erodes the capability for efficient collective action. According to this view, the liability is one of senescence: mortality rates increase with age. March's (1991) account of organizational learning tells a cautionary tale about the consequences of the continual refinement of a competence. Organizations that seek to exploit their competencies by searching for everbetter refinements of their existing capabilities find themselves in a compe-tency trap if the world changes. Only organizations that have already achieved some competence and follow a so-called exploitation strategy can be trapped by their competence. Thus this line of argument opposes the mainstream account, at least in the case of the exploitation strategy.
D. Positional Advantage
A final set of relevant arguments about the effect of age on mortality rates concerns the organization's position in the social structure. Stinchcombe (1965) points out that trust matters in building ties with other organizations (e.g., potential suppliers and customers) and important actors in the social environment (e.g., holders of capital, government officials and regulators, and so forth) and that it takes time for trust to develop in external relations. Because maintaining good relations with key external actors enhances organizational performance and also arguably affects survival chances directly, the buildup of favorable external ties over organizational lifetimes lowers mortality rates. This argument too implies negative age dependence in mortality rates.
Positional advantages come in many forms. These include occupancy of positions that bridge structural holes (Burt 1992) , favorable reputation (Kreps 1996) , high status (Podolny 1993; Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996) , market power, and political influence. Some positional advantages such as bridging structural holes would seem not to depend upon age and experience. Others, such as market power and, possibly, political influence, appear to be more influenced by size than by age. Still others, such as favorable reputation and high status, presumably depend upon some demonstrated history of performance and thus depend in part upon age. New organizations thus find themselves at a disadvantage when reputation and status matter. Although not all kinds of positional advantages accrue to experience, I am not aware of any argument claiming that such advantages decline systematically with age. Thus, arguments about position advantage, if they bear on the issue at all, concur with Stinchcombe's original assertion of negative age dependence.
These arguments about endowments, imprinting, positional advantages, and capabilities have been invoked in varying combinations to ex-plain patterns of positive, negative, and nonmonotonic age dependence. Endowment theories are seen to imply positive age dependence. Theories about imprinting effects also appear to imply positive age dependence. Arguments about capabilities can imply either negative or positive age dependence, depending on whether the relevant capabilities are thought to improve or to deteriorate with age. And, it is usually claimed that the cumulation of positional advantages as organizations age results in negative age dependence. Finally, analysts frequently use a mixture of two or more processes to make predictions. For instance, those who emphasize the role of endowments in shaping early mortality experiences have overlaid this process of positive age dependence with standard stories about the age-dependent accumulation of competence and positional advantage. Thus Brü derl and Schü ssler (1990), Fichman and Levinthal (1991), and Brü derl et al. (1996) assume that mortality rates rise with age initially due to the exhaustion of endowments and then fall with further aging due to the improvement of capabilities with age. Of course, other combinations are possible.
With the key concepts in hand, we turn now to the formalization. This formalization addresses some of the central ideas about the relationship between age and the rate of organizational mortality. It concentrates on endowment, capability, and position. The formalization does not consider either the effect of size on mortality rates or the interaction of size and age in affecting mortality rates. Doing so would require a substantially more extensive formalization.
III. FORMALIZING THE LIABILITIES OF NEWNESS, ADOLESCENCE, AND SENESCENCE
As noted at the outset, this analysis uses the tools of FOL to rationally reconstruct the various theories and to verify the soundness of the derivations. Proofs of all lemmas (minor theorems) and the main theorems were verified with OTTER (Organized Techniques for Theorem-proving and Effective Research; McCune 1994), which is a theorem prover for FOL with the equality relation. FOL contains the quantifiers: ∀, the universal quantifier ("for all") and ∃, the existential quantifier ("there exists") and the connectives: ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), → (implies) and ↔ (if and only if ). The equality symbol ϭ is a special two-place predicate with the fixed interpretation that a sentence of the form x ϭ y is true if and only if x and y denote the same object.
The notation is summarized in table 1. Uppercase strings denote predicates and functions. Lowercase letters denote the objects that possess the properties or are mapped by the functions. One-place predicates denote the properties of objects. For instance, the predicate O(x) indicates that an object x is an organization. Predicates with more than one argument "slot" and variables denote relations between objects. (Predicates tell that a certain relationship is true; functions define mappings of objects.) For instance, the basic variable in these formalizations is historical time, denoted by t. The function of most substantive relevance, A(x,t), gives an object's age at time t.
A. Capability, Position, and Mortality
This subsection presents a set of propositions that-in one form or another-find application in theories of the liability of newness, adolescence, senescence, and obsolescence. These substantive arguments concern the effects of organizational age on the hazard of mortality. Two properties of the age function deserve note: age is nonnegative and increases monotonically with time in existence:
Meaning postulate 1.-Age is nonnegative and monotonic in t.
Read: for all values of x, t 0 and t, if an object x is an (existing) organization, then the object's age is greater than or equal to zero, and the statement that the object's age at time t exceeds its age at t 0 implies that time t is greater than time t 0 , and the statement that the object's age at t equals its age at t 0 implies that t ϭ t 0 . The dependent variable, H(x, t), is an organization's instantaneous rate of mortality at time t. In some earlier formalizations (Péli et al. 1994; , the mortality rate has been interpreted as a population-level outflow. In the present context, the rate should be interpreted as an organization-level hazard. (The appendix contains a pair of technical background assumptions used in deriving results about effects on the hazard.)
The substantive core for the first three formalizations involves the relations of endowments, capability, position, and the hazard of mortality. The review of the arguments about endowment effects in organizational mortality suggested that endowments play the role of transitory initial advantages. They buffer new organizations from some of the force of selection processes for a time. But these advantages get exhausted relatively quickly (in the scale of organizational lifetimes). On this interpretation, endowments can be conceptualized as transitory immunity from the risk of mortality. Suppose that an endowment lasts until age ⑀. This idea can be represented in terms of a predicate that tells that an organization possesses immunity at a given time: IM(x, t). That is, an endowment provides immunity that lasts from founding until age ⑀ (meaning postulate 1, which states that age is nonnegative, requires that ⑀ Ն 0; however, the case when ⑀ ϭ 0 is uninteresting, because there is no effect of the endowment).
Definition 1.-An endowment provides an immunity that lasts until an organization's age exceeds ⑀.
In the context, it makes sense to specify that endowments are the only source of immunity.
Assumption 1.-An unendowed organization never possesses immunity.
Finally, we need a specification of the role of immunity in the process of organizational mortality. According to the image used here, the hazard of mortality remains constant at a very low level (possibly zero) during the period of immunity.
6 There are two ideas here. First, the hazard stays constant during the period of immunity.
Assumption 2.-An organization's hazard of mortality is constant during periods in which it has immunity.
Second, immunity has an overwhelming effect on the mortality rate, an effect that overrides the effects of other potentially relevant conditions such as capability and quality of position.
Assumption 3.-An organization's hazard of mortality is lower during periods in which it has immunity than in periods in which it does not.
Outside of periods of immunity, variations in capability and performance affect the hazard. The function C(x, t) maps an object's capability at time t and P(x, t) tells the quality of its position at time t.
Assumption 4.-When an organization lacks immunity, superior capability and position imply a lower hazard of mortality.
The liability-of-newness theory builds upon assumptions that relate an organization's age to the development of its capabilities and positional advantages. Stinchcombe and others have identified several processes by which aging enhances capability and position in a constant environment. To simplify, this formalization considers the stock of organizational knowledge as an instance of capability and the quality of ties to external actors who control important resources as an instance of the quality of a structural position. 7 The function K(x, t) records an object's collective knowledge at time t; and T(x, t) tells the quality of its external ties at time t. The main intuition behind the senescence argument holds that organizations develop encrustations of internal frictions, precedents, and political compromises as they age and that these encrustations impede timely collective action. A diminished capacity for timely collective action amounts to a loss of capability. This formalization also considers only one instance of the purportedly relevant conditions: the accumulation of internal friction. The function F(x, t) records an object's intensity of internal friction at time t.
According to the standard liability-of-newness story, collective knowledge contributes to capability. Arguments for senescence assume that the accumulation of internal friction diminishes capability. It is helpful to develop a simple framework that applies to both cases so that each theory can be regarded as a special case of the general formulation. The liabilityof-newness proposition will be derived by assuming that internal friction does not vary with age while capability and position increase with age; and the liability-of-senescence proposition will be derived by assuming that internal friction accumulates with age while capability and position remain constant. The core assumptions presented here are tailored to fit these requirements. 
Assumption 6.-Improved ties with external actors enhance an organization's position.
With these assumptions in place, mortality hazards can be related to knowledge, internal friction, and ties (see fig. 1 ). The following pair of lemmas establishes the connections. Note that they apply only to periods in which organizations lack immunity (either because an organization lacks endowment or because the period of immunity produced by an endowment has ended.) During periods of immunity, the hazard is a constant according to assumption 2. Lemma 1.-When an organization lacks immunity, increased collective knowledge and superior external ties lower its hazard of mortality when internal friction does not increase (from assumptions 1-6).
Lemma 2.-When an organization lacks immunity, the growth of internal friction elevates its hazard of mortality when its knowledge and the quality of its ties are constant (from assumptions 1-6).
B. The Liabilities of Newness and Adolescence
The liability-of-newness argument, as formalized here, rests on the premise that the processes that improve capability and position-knowledge and the quality of ties-increase monotonically with organizational age: Assumption 7.-An organization's stock of knowledge increases monotonically with its age.
Assumption 8.-The quality of an organization's external ties increases monotonically with its age.
The standard argument for the liability of newness does not consider the effect of internal friction. For the formalization to remain faithful to the original argument, it should not mix this process with the others. To meet this constraint, this section assumes that an organization's internal friction remains constant over age.
Assumption 9.-An organization's internal friction does not vary with its age.
These assumptions yield straightforward links between age and capability and quality of position (see fig. 2 ). The following lemmas record the implications of these assumptions for age variations in capability and position.
Lemma 3.-An organization's capability increases monotonically with its age (from assumptions 5 and 7-9).
Lemma 4.-An organization's structural position improves monotonically with its age (from assumptions 8 and 6).
The foregoing definitions, assumptions, and lemmas imply Stinchcombe's theorem on the liability of newness as a consequence of age-dependent enhancement of capability and position for the case of organizations lacking endowments:
Theorem 1.-The liability-of-newness theorem (Stinchcombe 1965) : an unendowed organization's hazard of mortality declines monotonically with its age (from definition 1, assumptions 1-4, and lemmas 1 and 2).
This formulation also implies a theorem on the liability of adolescence as a consequence of age-dependent enhancement of capability and position for the case of organizations with endowments.
Theorem 2.-The liability-of-adolescence theorem (Brü derl and Schü ssler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991) : an endowed organization's hazard of mortality is constant during its period of immunity, jumps when its immunity ends, and decreases with further aging but remains above the level during the immunity period (from definition 1, assumptions 1-4, and lemmas 1 and 2).
C. The Liability of Senescence
Next consider the first of the opposing arguments: the senescence hypothesis. The formalization in this section uses the same general structure as discussed to this point. However, it makes crucial changes in the three assumptions pertaining to the effect of aging on the determinants of organizational performance, assumptions 7-9. These three assumptions are replaced with others that reflect the senescence argument as stated in Section II.
The senescence argument emphasizes capability. It identifies processes that diminish capability and argues that these processes increase in strength as organizations age. Here this effect is represented by the accumulation of internal frictions. The spirit of the senescence argument suggests that one assume that internal friction increases with age.
Extant statements of the senescence story are silent about the role of knowledge and structural position. Therefore, to represent this argument, assume now that knowledge and the quality of ties to external actors also do not change with age. Assumption 10.-An organization's stock of organizational knowledge does not vary with its age (contra assumption 7).
Assumption 11.-The quality of an organization's external ties does not vary with its age (contra assumption 8).
Assumption 12.-An organization's internal friction increases monotonically with its age (revising assumption 9).
With these assumptions about knowledge, position, and friction, only the strength of internal friction depends upon age (see fig. 3 ). These assumptions portray a situation in which an organizations grows older without growing wiser and accumulates baggage that impedes its collective action. The following pair of (trivial) lemmas connects these assumptions to the hazard.
Lemma 5.-An organization's capability decreases monotonically with its age (from assumptions 5, 10, and 12).
Lemma 6.-An organization's structural position does not vary with its age (from assumptions 6 and 9).
The assumptions in this section imply positive age dependence in mortality hazard for an unendowed organization (contra theorem 1).
Theorem 3.-The senescence theorem for unendowed organizations (Barron et al. 1994) : an unendowed organization's hazard of mortality increases monotonically with its age (from definition 1, assumptions 1-4, and lemmas 5 and 6).
Previous work did not consider the potential effect of endowments in the context of senescence. The formulation in this section carries over to the case of endowed organizations. There is, however, a slight difference: due to initial immunity, the hazard does not rise monotonically at all ages for endowed organizations. Instead, the hazard is constant during the period of immunity and then rises monotonically with age.
Theorem 4.-The senescence theorem for endowed organizations: An endowed organization's hazard of mortality remains constant during the period of immunity and increases monotonically with its age once immunity ends (from definition 1, assumptions 1-4, and lemmas 5 and 6).
The reasoning underlying the claims of liabilities of newness and senescence run parallel, with differing assumptions about the role of age in shaping capability and position. Each story can be regarded as a special case of a more general story in which aging can both enhance and diminish capability, depending on the relative strength of the links of age with the cumulation of knowledge and the intensification of internal friction.
IV. FORMALIZING ALIGNMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL DRIFT, AND THE LIABILITY OF OBSOLESCENCE
The remainder of the formalization addresses the implications of imprinting and obsolescence. Making this shift involves some changes in the formalisms. The two theories of age dependence considered in the previous section fit nicely with statements made in terms of functions because the theoretical notions concern processes that increase continuously with age. The obsolescence argument builds on the image of some things (environments) shifting and other things (core features of organizations) getting stuck, and it seems best to represent this argument with predicates that tell whether certain objects have shifted and whether others have not.
The remainder of the article presents two kinds of formalizations of the obsolescence process. The first version closely parallels the formalizations just discussed, using functions such as capability and age. The second formalization relies extensively on predicates. Because the modeling structure in both cases differs from that used in the previous section, this section begins (nearly) anew. Several features of the core of the foregoing formalization carry over. These are meaning postulates 1 (age is nonnegative) and 2 (age is monotonic) and the definitions of the functions and predicates. The definition of endowment as providing temporary immunity (definition 1) and three assumptions about endowments (assumption 1, unendowed organizations lack immunity; assumption 2, the hazard is constant within periods of immunity; and assumption 3, the hazard is lower during periods of immunity) are also retained.
A. An Alternative Core: Alignment in Drifting Environments
The theory to be addressed in this section concerns the effects of the combination of environmental change and inertia rather than genuine aging. The key modeling issue here is how to formalize the relevant part of the imprinting hypothesis. One approach, which is used here, considers external alignment, the fit between an organization's structural features and capabilities and the demands of its external environment (Hannan 1996) . The obsolescence story posits that capabilities are specific to environments. 9 Refining obsolete routines (by, e.g., learning by doing) and better coordinating activities that support obsolete routines do not have mortality-diminishing effects. In other words, external misalignment can be regarded as a mismatch of capabilities and environments. This idea is represented by the predicate, AL(x, t), which tells whether an object, x, is (or is not) aligned with its environment at time t. That is, an organization finds itself either aligned or not aligned with its environment.
Next, consider the issue of environmental change, which drives the obsolescence process. Suppose that the environment can occupy different states at different times, meaning that it imposes different adaptive demands at different times. Does it make sense to think of an organization as being aligned with more than one state of the environment? If the environments impose similar adaptive demands, it does. But the notion of alignment also suggests that an organization's capability cannot be aligned with dissimilar states of the environment. In other words, dissimilarity can be defined in terms of alignment. Two states of the environment impose dissimilar adaptive demands if an organization cannot be aligned with both.
This idea can be represented with the three-place predicate, DS(x,t 0 ,t), which tells whether the environments at times t 0 and t are dissimilar for organization x. 
In substantive context, this assumption means that the alternative states of the environment pose very different adaptive demands. Therefore, this formulation applies to situations in which the states of the environment differ greatly when compared with the repertoires of organizational routines available to the members of the population of organizations. Two properties of the dissimilarity predicate need to be noted. First, there is a piece of "background knowledge" that tells that any environment is similar with itself.
Background assumption 1.
-The environment at any time is similar with itself. ∀t [¬ DS(x, t, t)].
Second, background assumption 1 and definition 2 imply Lemma 7.-The dissimilarity relation is symmetric.
A strong-form version of the imprinting hypothesis posits that alignment is maximal at (or shortly after) founding, because organizationbuilders can make use of state-of-the art designs and adapt to prevailing cultural understandings (Hannan, Burton, and Baron 1996) . That is, designers can tune structures and routines to the state of the environment at the time of founding. If the environment changes, then the inertial forces on structures, processes, and capabilities restrict the ability of organizations to re-align with the new environment.
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Assumption 13.-An organization is aligned with the state of the environment at its time of founding.
According to theories of alignment, organizations have superior capabilities in environments with which they align.
Assumption 14.-An organization's capability is higher in the state of the environment to which it is aligned.
Representing the idea of obsolescence requires specification of a time path of change in the relevant environment. According to the general idea of obsolescence, organizations get stuck with core features that become ill-suited to the environment with the passage of time. Although many different scenarios of environmental change are consistent with this image, this article considers only one simple case that seems to capture the key insight: drift. If an environment drifts, its states at (widely) different times are (strongly) dissimilar. When an environment drifts, the probability that it returns to some previous state is vanishingly small. (In the formalization, this event is assumed to be impossible.) For instance, technological change involves drift: technical standards change over time and do not return to earlier standards.
Environmental drift differs from the broader category of environmental change. Environmental change can involve repeated shifts among alternative states with the possibility of returns to earlier states. For instance, sociological models of niche width consider cases in which environments can alternate between two states, for example, feast or famine. When an organization or population of organizations finds itself misaligned with the current state of such an environment, it should not be regarded as "obsolete." The concept of obsolescence seems most meaningful in the case of drifting environments. The remainder of the formalization specializes to the case of drifting environments.
The notion of drift means that an organization's environment might remain in the close neighborhood of a given position for some time but will eventually move beyond the neighborhood. Suppose the neighborhood boundary encloses the set of similar environmental states (from the perspective of the organization). Then, as long as the environment stays within the neighborhood, the various states of the environment are similar. Suppose that a drifting environment does not return to its initial neighborhood once it leaves and that there is a (common) age, σ, at which the environment drifts beyond a given initial neighborhood. Then, age and dissimilarity are linked:
Assumption 15.-Environmental drift: the environments at times separated by more than σ are dissimilar.
B. The Liability of Obsolescence in Drifting Environments
Existing statements of the obsolescence argument consider capability but not positional advantage. To represent these arguments here, I continue to assume that quality of position does not play a role, by weakening lemma 1 from the previous formulation to apply only to capability and mortality hazards and implementing the lemma as an assumption in this formulation:
Assumption 16.-Superiority in capability lowers the hazard of mortality when an organization lacks immunity.
Combining the assumptions of environmental drift and constancy of position with the assumptions in Section IVA yields two theorems about obsolescence. One concerns unendowed organizations, and the second concerns endowed organizations. Both tell that mortality rates of old organizations exceed those of young ones. The only difference is the profile of positive age dependence. Age dependence is monotonic positive over the whole age range for unendowed organizations. For endowed organizations, the hazard remains constant during the period of immunity and then rises monotonically with age when immunity ends.
Theorem 5.-The obsolescence theorem for unendowed organizations (Barron et al. 1994) : an unendowed organization's hazard of mortality increases with age in a drifting environment (from definitions 1 and 2, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1-3, 13-15, and 16).
Again a parallel theorem holds for endowed organizations. However, this case involves a slight complication because two parameters, ⑀ and σ, matter. The following pair of lemmas cover the two relevant cases (⑀ Ն σ and ⑀ Ͻ σ).
Lemma 8.-When ⑀ Ͻ σ in a drifting environment, an endowed organization's hazard of mortality remains constant until age reaches ⑀, then jumps to a higher level, then jumps again at age σ (from definitions 1 and 2, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1-3, 13-15, and 16).
Lemma 9.-When ⑀ Ն σ, an endowed organization's hazard of mortality remains constant until age ⑀ and then jumps to a higher level in a drifting environment (from definitions 1 and 2, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1-3, 13-15, and 16).
Obviously, the hazard at older ages exceeds the hazard during the youthful (immunized) period.
Theorem 6.-The obsolescence theorem for endowed organizations: In a drifting environment, an endowed organization's hazard of mortality is constant during the period of immunity; beyond the period of immunity, the hazard rises with age (from lemmas 8 and 9).
C. Fragile and Robust Positions in Drifting Environments
The formulations considered to this point show that a reasonably general set of assumptions about capability and position can be altered to accommodate four theories of age dependence: those implying liabilities of newness, adolescence, senescence, and obsolescence. These formulations differ about the sign of age dependence-it is negative in the first, has in inverted-U shape in the second, and is positive in the other two. All of these formulations treat a population of organizations as homogeneous with respect to the process. Yet, as noted at the outset, some recent research reveals more complex patterns in which the form of age dependence differs for different classes of organizations in a population. In the relevant research (Hannan et al. 1998) , the factor separating the classes is organizational size: mortality hazards rise with age for small organizations and decline with age for large ones. Given these results, it is interesting to explore how the assumptions about capability, position, and aging might be altered so as to produce such a pattern. This section takes up this task by reformulating the assumptions about position. It builds on the set of definitions and assumptions in Section IVA but does not use those in Section IVB.
Consider the issue of positional advantage in the case of drifting environments. It seems unreasonable to assume that all positional advantages can be preserved when environments drift. This section introduces a distinction between two types of structural position: fragile and robust. Fragile positions depend upon some potentially unstable configuration of ties. In this context, instability means that the stability of a position or the advantages accruing to incumbency in a position are very sensitive to the state of the environment-small changes in the environment can destroy the position or its value. For instance, an organization whose positional advantage stems from its ties with a particular political leader occupies a fragile position. If political conditions change and this leader loses power, then the positional advantage vanishes. In contrast, robust positions depend upon the occupation of highly reproducible positions, those whose value is relatively insensitive to the state of the environment. High status provides a good example of a robust position, because a positive feedback loop runs from high status to capability; for example, high-status actors can produce signals of high quality at lower cost (Podolny 1993) . Because environmental changes likely damage fragile positions more than robust ones, fragile and robust positions can be defined in terms of the degree to which their advantages generalize over environments.
This formalization builds on the assumption that gaining advantage from robust position takes time but that fragile positions can provide advantages at founding. This assumption appears to fit the examples of fragile and robust positions used above. Consider examples of each case. If a fragile position builds on a favorable tie to a particular actor, there is no reason why this tie cannot provide advantage from an organization's founding (when, e.g., it depends on the ties between the leaders of the organization and the external actor). If, in contrast, organizations building robust positions invest in high quality-which will eventually generate positional advantages such as favorable reputation and high status that have value in many states of the environment-then such a positional investment is unlikely to pay off immediately. For instance, it takes time for quality to be acknowledged and status to be conferred. For simplicity, assume that an organization does not obtain advantage from robust position until it passes age τ.
The formulations considered to this point assume a range of positions with varying quality, represented by the function P(x, t). It helps clarify issues here to narrow and consider only two values, using the predicate PA(x, t), which records the presence/absence of positional advantage. Although organizations might be able change their type of position, this formalization assumes that they cannot.
We need formal definitions of fragile and robust position that fit these images. For fragile position, the key idea holds that environmental change destroys the value of the position. It will simplify the analysis to tie loss of advantage from fragile positions to the specification of drift already developed. Environmental drift eliminates alignment, and it also wrecks fragile positions. Alignment and fragile position might in general differ in their sensitivity to environmental change. One could incorporate such a difference by introducing another drift parameter that applies to fragile position. Not much would seem to be gained by adding such a complication. This formalization employs the simplifying assumption that the same parameter, σ, governs both the loss of alignment and the loss of positional advantage from fragile position.
Definition 3.-An organization's position is fragile if and only if it does not provide advantage after age σ.
According to the image of robust position, drift does not matter. All that needs to be specified is the time that it takes for an organization to begin gaining advantage from occupancy of a robust position. This duration is denoted here as τ.
Definition 4.
-An organization's position is robust if and only if it provides positional advantages only after age
If an organization's position can be both fragile and robust, then the foregoing definitions yield contradictions. For instance, for the portion of the age range in which age is less than σ and less than τ, definition 3 says that the organization possesses positional advantage and definition 4 says that it does not.
Lemma 10.-An organization's position cannot be both fragile and robust (from definitions 3 and 4).
Finally, a rule must be stated for combining the effects of capability and positional advantage on mortality hazards. (This section bypasses the link through performance here to simplify the argument.) In the style of , one can introduce ordered levels of the hazard of mortality, using the name constants: very low, low, mod 1 , mod 2 , and high.
Assumption 17.-An organization's immunity, alignment of capability chances. I simplify to the assumption that positions remain constant over lifetimes to avoid overly complicating the story at this point.
with the current state of the environment and positional advantage jointly affect the hazard of mortality with the following ordinal scaling:
Derivations require that the inequalities implied by the natural language hold in the formalization for the name constants denoting the levels of the mortality hazards:
Assumption 18.-The levels of the hazard of mortality are ordered:
Note that assumptions 18 and 19 (below) implement the ideas that immunity overrides other potential forces affecting the hazard and that the hazard remains constant during periods of immunity. Thus these assumptions have the same effect as assumptions 2 and 3 in the formalization used in Section III. Determinate results also depend on some specification of the relative importance of capability (alignment) and position. This formalization takes the view that positional advantage matters more than the alignment of capability with the environment for the hazard of mortality (mod 2 Ͼ mod 1 ). This assumption reflects sociological arguments about the effects of position on the returns to quality performance. For instance, Podolny (1993) shows that a "Matthew effect" applies to organizations: organizations that occupy high status positions get more credit than those that occupy low status positions for a performance of a given quality. Likewise Burt's (1992) arguments about "structural holes" also imply that positional advantage dominates. This assumption is implemented by refining this ordinal scaling of the hazards.
Assumption 19.-Position dominates alignment:
It turns out that this assumption does not matter substantively in most of what follows. That is, most of the results also follow if the inequality in this assumption is reversed, because the results usually depend upon a contrast of either of the mod categories with very low or low or with high. Cases in which this assumption plays an important role will be noted in what follows. What do these assumptions imply about age dependence in mortality 
Note.-These are the implications of drift for the hazard of mortality for organizations lacking immunity with robust and fragile positions.
hazards? Answering this question requires that one "calculate" alignment and positional advantage by cuts on the age scale for organizations with fragile and robust positions with and without endowments.
Case 1: organizations lacking endowments.-Consider first the simpler case of organizations lacking endowments. The main result is that the pattern of age dependence in the hazard of mortality diverges by type of position. The top panel of table 2 gives the results, and figure 4 displays the implied pattern of age dependence for unendowed organizations with fragile position. (Note that τ is irrelevant in this case.) The hazard of mortality rises with age: Theorem 7.-Fragile position without endowment: The hazard of mortality increases with age for an unendowed organization with a fragile position in drifting environments (from definitions 1-3, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19).
In the case of robust position, three cases must be considered: (1) environmental change destroys alignment when advantage can be acquired from a robust position (σ ϭ τ), (2) environmental change destroys alignment more quickly than advantage can be acquired from a robust position (σ Ͻ τ), and (3) advantage can be acquired from a robust position before environmental change destroys alignment (τ Ͻ σ).
When σ ϭ τ, age dependence in the hazard for organizations with robust positions is monotonic negative:
Theorem 8.-Robust position without endowment when σ ϭ τ: If environmental drift destroys alignment exactly when advantage can be gained from occupancy of robust position (σ ϭ τ), then the hazard of mortality for an unendowed organization with a robust position decreases with age (from definitions 1 and 2, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19) . Figure 5 shows the result for the other two cases, one in which σ Ͻ τ (on the left) and one with this inequality reversed (on the right). Note that, when drift produces environmental dissimilarity quickly relative to the speed of payoff to robust position, the hazard of mortality rises with age initially before declining (below the initial level)-there is a "liability of adolescence."
Theorem 9.-Robust position without endowment when σ Ͻ τ: If environmental drift destroys alignment before advantage can be gained from occupancy of robust position (σ Ͻ τ), then the hazard of mortality for an unendowed organization with a robust position initially increases with age, then decreases with further aging and falls below the initial level (from definitions 1, 2, and 4, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19) . In the second case in figure 5 (on the right), when advantage can be gained from robust position before drift destroys alignment, then the mortality hazard peaks in youthful periods. The hazard falls with aging initially and then rises; but the hazard at later ages falls below the initial level of the hazard.
Theorem 10.-Robust position without endowment when σ Ͼ τ: If advantage can be gained from occupancy of robust position before environmental drift destroys alignment (σ Ͼ τ), then the hazard of mortality for an unendowed organization with a robust position initially decreases with age and then rises with further aging but remains below the initial level (from definitions 1, 2, and 4, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19) .
Despite the difference in the "middle" period for these scenarios, the comparison between the early and late hazards is the same: the hazard for old organizations falls below the hazard for young ones. So this is one recipe for generating a result that parallels the new empirical findings on mortality rates in automobile industries (Hannan et al. 1998) . Suppose that the form of positional advantage (fragile and robust) corresponds with position in the size distribution and that the organizations lack endowments. That is, assume that small organizations occupy fragile positions and that large ones occupy robust positions. Such an assumption does not appear unreasonable in the context of national automobile industries. Large firms have positional advantages in distribution (networks of dealers) that appear robust over many important kinds of changes in relevant environments. Such positions are rarely available to very small firms in these industries. Suppose that (1) position matters more than capability, (2) environmental and change erodes inert capabilities, (3) fragile position advantage can be gained at founding, but (4) advantage from robust position takes time to develop, then these theorems fit the result that age dependence in the hazard of mortality is positive for small (unendowed) organizations and negative for large (unendowed) ones.
The assumption that position dominates capability (assumption 19) matters in the foregoing argument for the case of organizations with robust positions. If we reversed this assumption, specifying that mod 1 Ͼ mod 2 , then the "shape" of the relationship between age and the hazard would be the same as given in theorems 9 and 10. However, the comparison between the hazard near founding and the hazard at late ages would be different. Instead of the long-run hazard falling below the initial level (as in theorems 9 and 10), the long-run hazard would exceed the hazard in youth. That is, long-run age dependence would be positive for unendowed organizations with robust positions if capability dominates position in shaping life chances.
Case 2: organizations with endowments.-It is intuitively clear that adding endowments to the picture must create a pattern of long-run positive age dependence in the hazard. When organizations are assumed to begin with endowments, then the hazard of mortality for new organizations is very low, whether their positions are fragile or robust. Aging can only increase the hazard, when the immunity ends and when drift eventually erodes alignment. The following theorem shows that this intuition is correct under the assumptions made in this section. (The intermediate steps needed to prove this theorem are reported in the appendix.)
Theorem 11.-The long-run hazard of mortality for an endowed organization with either a fragile or a robust position in a drifting environment exceeds the hazard near founding.
Proof.-Theorem A1 (in the appendix) states that the conclusion of this theorem hold for organizations with fragile positions. Lemmas A4 and A5 state that the conclusion holds for organizations with endowed, robust positions under the following circumstances: (1) (⑀ Ն τ) and (2) 
. The only case that remains to be proven is for σ Ͼ τ Ͼ ⑀. According to the qualitative calculus (assumption 18), the hazard for the segment from founding to age ⑀ equals very low (because of the immunity conveyed by the endowment). In the rightmost segment, ages greater than σ, organizations have positional advantage (age Ͼ τ) and lack alignment (age Ͼ σ). With these values of the functions, the hazard beyond age σ is mod 1 which exceeds very low (by assumption 18). QED
V. DISCUSSION
The seemingly straightforward issue of age dependence in organizational mortality turns out on close inspection to be anything but simple. Inconsistency among theories and empirical findings abounds. Such inconsistency reflects the protean nature of the concept of organizational aging.
In one major line of work, aging means learning and solidifying external position. A contrary stream of research regards aging as increasing constraint on collective action, with the buildup of internal friction, precedent, and political deals combining to impede timely and reliable performance. The first set of formalizations presented here shows that these two lines of thinking can be cast as special cases of a general formulation in which aging can shape the cumulation of knowledge, internal friction, 13 This statement of the theorem uses comparisons involving the maximum of a pair of parameters. The theorem prover (OTTER), which was used to check proofs, does not include such expressions as basic "functors." Therefore, lemmas and theorems with such expressions must be decomposed into sets of simpler ones that do not rely on the minimum and maximum operations. and other constraints and the quality of external ties. The formalization also treats endowments as generating temporary (possibly partial) immunity from mortality. Adding endowments to the picture does not really change the substantive conclusion for the senescence argument. But it does matter in the liability-of-newness setup, changing the monotonic negative relation between age and the hazard to a nonmonotonic relation, with a liability of adolescence.
The general framework in which these three cases are embedded might serve as a basis for reconciling the conflicting arguments. Allowing the valences of the various effects of aging to vary systematically among different kinds of organizational populations and different contexts would help specify the substantive conditions under which each type of liability operates. Such an effort would also undoubtedly make sense of inconsistencies in empirical findings.
A radically different idea about aging lies at the heart of much of the theory and research on the determinants of organizational mortality. This is the idea that aging per se does not affect the hazard of mortality; instead, age tracks the fit between an organization and its environment. This image builds on ideas of imprinting and structural inertia. According to the imprinting hypothesis, organizations best match their external environments at the time of their founding. According to structural inertia theory, subsequent changes to the core of these imprinted features are hard and risky to the organizations' survival chances. If environments drift over time, then inert organizations fall further behind as they age-they become obsolete. Under this scenario, the hazard of mortality for old organizations exceeds the hazard for young ones.
The second set of formalizations offered here attempts to represent the logic of this general argument. In this set, age tracks the dissimilarity between an organization's current environment and its founding environment. This argument is specialized to the case of drifting environments, using the idea that there is a (common) age at which the environment becomes sufficiently different from the founding environment that it imposes fundamentally different demands on the organization. Organizations are assumed to be aligned well with their founding environments and not to be aligned with environments that are dissimilar to it. In the simpler version, an organization's capability is assumed to be higher when it is aligned with its environment. Thus, alignment unravels because environments drift and inert organizations continue to rely on their old structures and processes. Age tracks environmental drift in this formulation. Hence capability declines as organizations age, and the hazard of mortality rises with age.
A second version of this general argument refines the notion of position. It distinguishes two types of structural position: fragile and robust. The difference between these types is that robust positions provide advantage over broader ranges of environmental variations. Fragile positions provide advantage immediately (at founding) but these advantages disappear when the environment becomes dissimilar. Robust positions do not provide advantage immediately; it takes time to build such positions. However, once established, robust positional advantages persist in all states of the environment. If organizations lack endowments, then age dependence is positive for the class of organizations with fragile positions and negative for those with robust positions. This difference in the pattern of age dependence by type of position might clarify the source of divergence in patterns of age dependence in recent the empirical research. For instance, suppose that organizational populations in drifting environments vary in the fractions of members with robust and fragile positions. If fragile positions predominate in a population, then simple age dependence will tend to be positive. But, if robust positions are the rule in some other populations, then simple age dependence will tend to be negative. Allowing endowments to affect the hazard of mortality does not change the result for organizations with fragile positions: age dependence is monotonically positive in drifting environments. However, endowment effects do complicate the picture for the case of robust positions. Under some of the specified conditions, the presence of an endowment produces the familiar "liability of adolescence." But, other conditions yield the opposite pattern, a "bathtub shape" relation between age and the hazard. The main result is that age dependence in the hazard of mortality is positive over the long run in drifting environments for endowed organizations with robust positions.
This article sought to clarify how the various stories "work" by interpreting them in FOL. The resulting formalizations are, of course, interpretations. Although they cannot reflect the full nuance of the natural language originals, they do place the common and divergent features of the contending theories in sharper relief.
However, these formalizations take only a first step in rationally reconstructing theories of age dependence. Some key issues still need to be addressed. Two seem to be especially pertinent. First, the review of theory and research on the issue indicated that age variations in organizational size plausibly play a role in generating patterns of age dependence. Obvious next steps would formalize these ideas in FOL and then seek to integrate the two formalizations. Second, there is an interesting tension between the obsolescence story and its formalizations here and the HannanFreeman (1984) theory of structural inertia. As formalized by the latter implies that the strength of structural inertia increases with age and also covaries with favorable selection chances (although inertia does not causally affect survival chances). The formalizations offered here imply that obsolescence increases with age and that obsolescence varies inversely with survival chances. Yet, inertia is cited here as one of the causes of obsolescence. Resolving this tension, which requires constructing a more general formalization, lies beyond the scope of this article. But some of the directions that such an effort might take deserve mention.
Structural inertia theory does not emphasize environmental change. That is, this theory treats the consequences of the accumulating of reliability and accountability for reproducibility, inertia, and life chances without addressing issues concerning changes in the fit between an organization's routines and capabilities and the environment. In contrast, the formalizations of obsolescence presented here address environmental change directly but do not consider age-related changes in such survival-related properties as reliability and accountability of collective action. Suppose that elements of each account are correct. In particular, suppose that organizations gain reliability and accountability as they age and that routines and structures become obsolete as organizations age. Then as organizations age, they get better and better at doing things that convey less and less value for survival. In stable environments, getting better at doing old things aids survival more than doing the latest thing. In volatile environment, the situation is reversed. And there is a spectrum of intermediate possibilities. Efforts at formalizing these and related ideas would, by unifying several "theory fragments," take a valuable step toward building general, yet precise, theories of organization.
APPENDIX Technical Background Assumptions
It simplifies equations to implement a trichotomy rule for the hazard (which can be interpreted to mean that "common sense" about inequalities applies):
Background assumption A1.-A trichotomy rule holds for the hazard. A background assumption about inequalities is also employed throughout the analysis:
Background assumption A2
Intermediate Steps in Deriving Theorem 11
This appendix provides the intermediate steps needed to prove the theorem that states that endowed organizations in drifting environments experience long-run positive age dependence (theorem 11). There are several intermediate steps because many different cases need to be considered. In the case of fragile positions, the relevant cases are ⑀ ϭ σ, ⑀ Ͼ σ, and ⑀ Ͻ σ. Lemma A1.-Fragile position with endowment when ⑀ ϭ σ : When endowments end when environmental drift destroys alignment (⑀ ϭ σ), then the hazard of mortality for an endowed organization with a fragile position remains constant during the period of immunity and jumps when immunity ends (from definitions 2-3, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-18). Now consider organizations with robust positions. Now there are 16 cases to be considered, because three parameters are relevant: ⑀, σ, and τ. Examination of these cases reveals that they can be collapsed into three sets. First, endowments can persist until positional advantage accrues to robust position (⑀ Ն τ). In this case, the hazard is constant at the level very low until the immunity ends. If drift has already eliminated alignment, then the hazard jumps immediately. Otherwise it jumps when drift subsequently eliminates alignment. Thus this case parallels the one for organizations with robust position but without endowments (theorem 8): age dependence in the hazard is monotonically positive.
Lemma A4.-Robust position with endowment when ⑀ Ն τ: The hazard of mortality for an endowed organization with a robust position rises monotonically with age when ⑀ Ն τ (from definitions 1, 2, and 4, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19). The second important case is one in which there is a nonzero interval between the ending of the endowment and the onset of position advantage from robust position (τ Ͼ ⑀) and positional advantage from robust position occurs after the loss of alignment due to drift (τ Ͼ σ).
Lemma A5.-Robust position with endowment when τ Ͼ max(⑀,σ): The hazard of mortality for an endowed organization with a robust position rises and then falls with age with the long-run level of the hazard exceeding the initial level when τ Ͼ ⑀ and τ Ͼ max(⑀,σ) (from definitions 1, 2, and 4, background assumption 1, and assumptions 1, 2, 13-15, and 17-19).
∀x, t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 {O(x) ∧ RB(x) ∧ EN(x) ∧ [A(x, t 0 ) ϭ 0] ∧ (σ Ͼ 0)
→ H(x, t 2 ) Ͼ H(x, t 3 ) Ͼ H(x, t 1 )}.
The third case is one in which σ Ͼ τ Ͼ ⑀, which is discussed in the proof of theorem 11.
